the reliance on the power by the Howard Coalition government in the education sector (which continued a trend started under the Hawke and Keating Labor governments). 10 Finally, the article will discuss in Part V the potential ways in which the spending power may be limited. The main focus of previous attempts to limit the power has either been the text of s 81 of the Constitution (the 'appropriations power') or the breadth of the executive power in s 61. An analysis of the historical background to the appropriations power and the relevant jurisprudence will be undertaken. From here, the article will develop a theory for limiting the spending power. The article concludes that there are two limitations which vary in their nature. Practically, the power should be limited through the constitutional supervision of the executive by Parliament in the appropriation process. Secondly, the power is also limited by subject matter where the executive seeks to do more than merely spend appropriated money. To take further action, such as the engagement in activities or the imposition of regulatory type contractual conditions, there must be a further source of executive power. This comes from s 61 of the Constitution and is therefore limited by the scope of the executive power.
II THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The Commonwealth's 'spending power' is an implied power found in a number of different provisions of the Constitution. Before a critique and analysis of the power can be undertaken, it is important to set out the relevant constitutional framework. Some provisions necessarily infer a limited spending power. Sections 51 and 52 provide that the Parliament has the power to make laws under a number of different heads of power. The power within these subject matters is plenary, 11 and would include the power to make laws for the expenditure of money either directly or through the incidental power. 12 Section 96 gives Parliament power to grant financial assistance to the States on the 'terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit.' 13 This section assumes a spending power to allow such grants of assistance to take place. These provisions are not the direct concern of this article.
A more general spending power may be implied from a combination of constitutional provisions relating to the appropriations and executive powers. Sections These sections are prefaced by the words 'for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth'. 12 Implied or express, under s 51(xxix) of the Constitution. 13 Section 96 grants have been discussed extensively elsewhere and are not the immediate concern of this paper. See, eg, A J Myers, 'The Grants Power: Key to Commonwealth-State Financial Relations ' (1970) been on the effective administration of government spending and little attention is paid as to whether the spending falls within the stated purpose. 20 
III FUNDING CRITIQUES
Government policy implementation through funding agreements is substantial. 21 For example, selection processes and criteria can be used to encourage particular behaviours from different stakeholders in a sector. Selection criteria can also be used to benefit chosen segments of society. Funding agreement conditions can be used to encourage and regulate behaviour of recipients. Such conditions may have no or little relevance to the economic efficiency of the funding but instead can be used to further other governmental agendas such as enforcing prescribed standards or prohibiting conduct.
The economic dominance of the Commonwealth means it is able to offer highly sought-after funding opportunities. Would-be funding recipients are operating in a limited market and are therefore often placed in an untenable 'take it' or 'leave it' position. This allows funding conditions determined unilaterally by the government to be incorporated into non-negotiable, boilerplate clauses.
Critiques of the use of funding to affect individuals' and community behaviour to achieve policy outcomes are discussed below. For ease of reference, they have been separated into two categories: the democratic and federal critiques. The implications flowing from a third critique -whether executive funding decisions are subject to judicial scrutiny through the usual mechanisms of administrative law 22 -are not necessary for consideration in the arguments developed in this article. The possibility that the use of executive funding may circumvent judicial review is nonetheless concerning from accountability and rule of law perspectives.
There are, of course, arguments supporting an unlimited funding ability. The equalisation of vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalance is an important function of the federal government in Australia. This is generally achieved through intergovernmental transfers expressly provided for in s 96 of the Constitution and again is not the immediate concern of this article. The necessary ability to control, stabilise and otherwise influence the federal economy through the fiscal or budgetary policy tools of taxation and spending is another argument. 23 It is unlikely that this type of control requires an unlimited spending power. This article asserts that whilst these considerations are important, they cannot and should not trump the concerns raised in This raises questions about the source of jurisdiction of the courts (if any) in either the common law or in statute, the justiciability of decisions, grounds of review, the availability of plaintiffs with requisite locus standi and available remedies. See the democratic and federal critiques outlined below given the Australian federal democratic Constitution.
A
The democratic critique Legislative process embraces fundamental democratic principles: accountability of Parliament to the elector base from which it gains the legitimacy to undertake its mandate and the transparency which is required by the public nature of the legislative process. 24 The impact legislation can have on civil and political liberties of the individual underpins the need for these principles. 25 In the Westminster system of responsible government, the executive gains legitimacy through holding the confidence of the lower house of Parliament, which is ultimately accountable to the people through election. 26 The executive is accountable to Parliament as it is required to obtain the consent of Parliament for its actions through the legislative process and, particularly relevant to this article, for taxation and expenditure. However, obtaining the details of executive funding processes and final agreements can be a difficult task for Parliament and more difficult for members of the public. Executive action is therefore often subject to less public and parliamentary scrutiny. 27 Lack of transparency (and therefore accountability) either directly to the public or to Parliament decreases the democratic legitimacy of executive action. This lack of legitimacy will be referred to as the 'democratic critique'.
The democratic critique has been amplified by the current approach to budgetary and appropriations processes. Since 1999, 'annual appropriation legislation' 28 has used an accrual accounting method, 29 and specified department appropriations by reference to broad 'outcomes' and 'outputs'. 30 Appropriations specified as these 'outcomes' and 25 Arrowsmith, above n 21, 234. 26 Sections 7, 24 and 64 of the Constitution in conjunction with several other sections, embody the convention of responsible government in Australia: Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 557-9. 27 Saunders and Yam, above n 21, 61-2. See also Seddon, above n 24, 548. 28 The annual appropriation legislation consists of the Appropriation Act (No 1) (Cth) which contains details for the ordinary annual governmental expenses; the Appropriation Act (No 2) (Cth) which contains appropriations for funds for expenditure on new policies, new capital expenditure, and grants to the States under s 96; the Appropriation Act (No 3) (Cth) and Appropriation Act (No 4) (Cth) which are passed as supplementary appropriations to the Appropriation Bills (No 1) and (No 2) (Cth) respectively; and the Supply Acts which are used where necessary as an interim measure in the event that the annual appropriation Acts are not passed by the start of the financial year. Appropriation legislation must be passed in accordance with the special procedure set out in ss 53, 54 and 56 of the Constitution. 'Outcomes' are defined as '[w]hat does government want to achieve?' whilst 'outputs' are '[h]ow does it achieve this?': see Department of Finance and Deregulation, Outcomes and 'outputs', when considered in isolation, are vague and indefinable. They provide no guidance as to what the money is actually intended to be spent on. Further information on what expenditure is intended to be authorised can be found in extraneous material, including the four Budget Papers 31 and the Commonwealth Departments' annual Portfolio Budget Statements. 32 Portfolio Budget Statements are used to indicate what activities (outputs) are intended to be treated as contributing to the relevant outcome. However, they do not limit the activities which may contribute to the output. 33 The Portfolio Budget Statements are tabled in the Senate and used by the legislative committees 34 as the basis of their budgetary scrutiny. 35 The legislative committees perform an important accountability function in the budgetary process. The committees scrutinise the annual and additional executive budget proposals in public hearings prior to the introduction of the appropriation legislation into the Senate. Ministers in the Senate or officers may be asked for explanations relating to the items of proposed expenditure. The committees also have access to the statements of expenditure from the advance to the Finance Minister (discussed below), the annual reports of agencies and reports from the Auditor-General. The committees report back to the Senate.
Since 1999, the Parliament has often appropriated funds on an open-ended basis. The annual appropriation Acts no longer expire on 30 June of the following year. Rolling appropriations further complicate the details of amounts appropriated and the purposes for which they may have been previously authorised. 36 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Outputs It has even been suggested that the lack of transparency inherent in this system may be used by the government to create 'hollow logs' of appropriated money from previous years which may be then used at the discretion of the government, in a manner which is completely unaccountable to Parliament. The way in which this could be done, Kennedy suggests, is through the use of 'Special Accounts' which are provided for, eg, in s 13 of the Appropriation Act (No 1) 2007-08 (Cth). This allows the government to credit amounts from the CRF into these accounts provided the purpose of the account is covered in the appropriation item. Once amounts are credited to these accounts, the expenditure is no longer governed by the terms of the relevant Appropriation Act, but the terms of the Special Accounts. The government can easily transfer the whole amount of the appropriation item into these accounts annually, whether or not the amounts are expended in a particular year, allowing 'hollow logs' to develop: Kennedy, above n 29, 42-3.
Another factor which decreases parliamentary scrutiny over funding is the practice in Australia 37 to ensure the government has access to funds in an emergency (referred to as the 'advance to the Finance Minister'). 38 This process grants a set amount of funding to the Finance Minister for use as 'emergency' additional funding, whether that is because the amounts allocated to a particular purpose were insufficient because of an error or understatement or because the additional expenditure was unforeseen at the time of the passage of the appropriation legislation.
Many of the issues outlined above are demonstrated by the federal 'takeover' of the Mersey Public Hospital. The hospital was located in the marginal electorate of Braddon, Tasmania. The takeover occurred in August 2007, just over three months before the federal election. During an interim period the Tasmanian government continued to run the hospital, but the Commonwealth provided the funding to do so. In November 2007, the government purchased the hospital from Tasmania and pledged approximately $45 million per annum to ensure the hospital would continue to operate. 39 This commitment was clearly not contemplated by Parliament in the annual appropriation legislation, announced as it was in August 2007. Despite this, no special appropriation was made for the expenditure. 40 42 Including the takeover of the Mersey Hospital in Appropriation Act (No 1) means the government viewed it as a recurrent expenditure as opposed to a new policy which decreases the review powers of the Senate. 43 The current budgetary process was considered in Combet v Commonwealth. 44 The case was a challenge to government expenditure on advertising to promote the benefits of the proposed 'WorkChoices' amendments to the industrial relations system. 45 The challenge did not impugn the constitutional validity of the appropriation legislation as falling outside s 81 of the Constitution, but alleged that the particular expenditure did not fall within the purposes specified by Parliament as appropriation 'outcomes'. 46 In denying the challenge, the High Court effectively endorsed the reduction in parliamentary scrutiny of the appropriation process that has been discussed above. Chief Justice Gleeson said:
If Parliament formulates the purposes of appropriation in broad, general terms, then those terms must be applied with the breadth and generality they bear. 47 The joint judgment went so far as to say that appropriations may be made by Parliament for 'outcomes' which were not restrictive on the executive. That is, the purposes stated by Parliament in appropriation legislation, pursuant to s 81 of the The legislation had not been introduced to Parliament when the expenditures were made. 46 The asserted outcome was Department of Employment and Workplace Relations Outcome 2: 'Higher productivity, higher pay workplaces'. 
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Volume 37 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Constitution, did not have to be binding on the executive. 48 Taken to its extreme this case may signal tacit approval of complete parliamentary abdication of the substance of the appropriation process to the executive. Rather than the executive recommending the purposes of the appropriation and it being approved and appropriated by Parliament, 49 Parliament will appropriate an amount of funds to be used for the purposes subsequently determined by the executive. Lindell also points out that the case signifies that in order to limit executive expenditure, Parliament must specifically prohibit executive expenditure rather than specifically authorise it. 50 The Combet decision caused considerable consternation expressed by the minority judges in the case, 51 scholars, 52 and was a cause of a referral to the Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration. The Committee's report of March 2007 concluded that the transparency, specificity and accountability of appropriations needed substantial improvement. 53 The recent Australia 2020 Summit also considered the issue. The Final Report included as one of its 'top ideas' the need to strengthen government accountability to Parliament through 'reframing of appropriation Bills to specify individual projects and programs'. 54 Can good reasons be found to support abdication of Parliament's responsibility for approving the purpose of appropriations, and therefore spending? A number of points could be advanced. The executive may be better placed to know the intricacies of governance. 55 The executive may need flexibility in expenditure and funding to ensure it can react to 'urgent and unanticipated … needs of the community.' 56 However compelling these arguments are, they do not address the undermining of accountability and legitimacy which result from unsupervised executive control of The Committee recommendations included clearer, simpler specification of outcomes in measurable terms, reporting of unspent appropriations at the end of each financial year and return of unspent appropriations unless the Finance Minister determined there was good cause for the funds to be retained, and the re-introduction of requirements for approved expenditures to have a link and connection with the specified outcomes and purposes of the appropriations: Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, above n 5, xi-xiii. 54 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, above n 5, 309; see also at 327-8, 346. The record of discussion notes that the delegates discussed the importance of ensuring the descriptions of budget appropriates must be more specific to strengthen executive accountability to Parliament and improve the Parliamentary process. 55 Lindell, above n 50, 315. spending. A situation has been created whereby Parliament, let alone the general public, is unaware of the extent and details of executive spending. In these circumstances, how can Parliament hold government 'responsible'?
B
The federal critique The federal critique is based on the constitutional structure and a deeper assumption that federalism provides advantages to Australian citizens. It is closely related to the democratic critique; federalism provides an additional restraint on concentration of power through dispersion. Federalism also facilitates more direct democratic participation in local governance. The Commonwealth Parliament is constitutionally limited in its competence by a list of enumerated heads of power. 57 This effects a division of power between the States and the Commonwealth which underpins the Australian federal structure. Whether federal funding is subject to the same division of power is an unsettled area of law. 58 If federal funding is unlimited, where it is used as a tool of government policy there will necessarily be important implications for the federal system. 59 The federal critique of the Commonwealth's appropriation and spending powers has existed since inception. A debate on this point erupted in the Australasian Federal Convention of 1891. Mr A J Thynne sought amendments which would limit the Commonwealth's ability to appropriate funds for the executive to the subject matters contained in the Commonwealth's enumerated heads of legislative power. He expressed his concern that the strict lines of responsibility between the federal and State government must be maintained. During the ensuing debate, he received a sympathetic hearing from Inglis Clark and Sir Samuel Griffith but not from Alfred Deakin. 60 Echoing many of the arguments made against the democratic critique, Deakin said of the proposed amendment:
[It] is on first presentation very taking and seems legitimate. Unfortunately, however, the result would be to bring into existence for those purposes a rigid constitution. You would have the appropriation acts of the federal parliament scanned through and through to ascertain if the parliament had not, to meet some pressing need, or in some unforeseen contingency, stepped outside the strict powers given to it. To provide against such a case it would be necessary for us to go through this measure from the first line to the last to see that every conceivable purpose legitimately belonging to the commonwealth was included within its four corners, so that every appropriation might be justified. Otherwise, in case of a sudden emergency, the federal parliament would find itself 
Federal Law Review
Volume 37 ____________________________________________________________________________________ compelled to go back to the constitution to discover whether by good fortune the contingency could be brought within the scope of any particular section. 61 The tension apparent in this debate has been described by Saunders as a 'familiar problem in all the older federations'. 62 In Australia, Mr Thynne's concerns from 1891 have become further aggravated by the broad interpretation given to Commonwealth heads of legislative power, 63 and the increased economic strength of the Commonwealth government. 64 An important effect of an unlimited funding capacity is through the reduction in a clear division of responsibilities between the federal and State government. This undermines the ability of electors to clearly distinguish which government is responsible in different areas. This adversely impacts the ability of electors to bring to account the correct government and Parliament in areas of underperformance. 65 The accountability and federal deficiencies of using spending to implement government policy have come under increasing scrutiny as a drift towards unchecked executive spending is becoming more evident. The next part of this article considers the prevalence of spending in Australia, focussing upon the recent use of funding in the higher education sector to illustrate the concerns in the critiques.
IV GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON DIRECT FUNDING IN AUSTRALIA
This part examines the use of 'direct funding', that is, funding which is provided directly to the ultimate non-State recipient. As discussed in Part II, unlike s 96 grants to the States, 66 the constitutional basis of direct funding is uncertain. It is often utilised in areas beyond the explicit legislative competence of the Commonwealth such as health, education and local government. As such, it provides a suitable focus for the existence of a broad spending power and the democratic and federal critiques.
The following discussion looks briefly at the history of direct funding in Australia, before turning to the recent reliance on direct funding under the Howard Coalition government. History reveals two major attempts to employ direct funding as a significant part of Commonwealth policy, in the 1940s and 1970s, both under Labor governments. The bipartisan enthusiasm towards direct funding shown by the Howard Coalition government may be an important development as previous political opposition to the practice may have restricted its use. 67
A
An historically Labor initiative The Fisher Labor government started the momentum for directly funded Labor social security policy with the Maternity Allowance Act 1912 (Cth). The constitutionality of the Act was questioned by several lawyers in subsequent Royal Commissions in the late 1920s. 68 As a result, no further schemes were enacted. 69 In the early 1920s, s 96 grants commenced, and achieved dominance as the preferred form of Commonwealth funding. 70 The rise of s 96 funding did not, however, mean that direct grants were abandoned. The Curtin government enacted a suite of general social welfare regimes which relied upon the general spending power of the Commonwealth. The Pharmaceutical Benefits Act 1944 (Cth) provided for the free supply of pharmaceutical benefits by chemists, hospitals and other approved persons to Australian residents through a system of practitioner registration and federal reimbursement. The Act broadly regulated public health: regulating the conduct of doctors, chemists, hospitals and setting standards for drugs, medicines and medical appliances and creating offences. The Act was successfully challenged in AttorneyGeneral (Vic) ex rel Dale v Commonwealth ('Pharmaceutical Benefits Case'). 72 The details of the legal arguments and judgment in this case are provided below, Part V, B, 2. Thus, the foray into direct spending looked to be short-lived. However, the decision was the impetus for a successful constitutional amendment inserting s 51(xxiiiA) which validated the existing social benefits schemes.
The Whitlam government also utilised direct funding in the 1970s, enacting schemes including the Australian Assistance Plan ('AAP'), the Regional Employment Development Scheme and Legal Aid. A constitutional challenge was mounted against the AAP, which established regional councils to plan and provide diverse social welfare services within the community. 73 The scheme and councils were established and funded under a $5.97 million appropriation combined with the exercise of the executive power; no other legislation was enacted at the time of the challenge. 74 This time, the High Court dismissed the action. The details of the judgment are provided below, Part V, B, 2. Perplexingly perhaps, this decision did not see the rise of direct funding in the same way as the decisions upholding federal s 96 grants had. 75
B
The Howard Coalition government: A foray into funding? The reliance on direct funding as a tool to bypass the States was one of many centralising mechanisms employed by the Howard Coalition government. 76 The following analysis will highlight the use of funding in the education sector. Direct funding is also increasingly prevalent in local government, 77 particularly in relation to the funding of roads, 78 and the health sector. 79 Funding agreements can be <http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/health-roihpg-overview-index.htm> at 1 April 2009. There are also a number of non-legislative direct funding schemes. For example, funding to peak community and profession bodies in relation to HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis C and Sexually Transmitted Infections, the 'More Doctors characterised as two types: those backed by legislation and those relying upon appropriations coupled with the exercise of the executive power.
1
Higher education In 1992, the Keating Labor government turned to direct funding in higher education. Previously, Commonwealth funding had been provided to higher education providers (universities and some vocational education providers) through the States under tied s 96 grants. The Higher Education Funding Act 1988 (Cth) was amended to change the basis of this funding. 80 In introducing the amendment Bill, the Minister gave two reasons for the change. First, tertiary education funding ought to reflect the reality of a national system of higher education funded primarily by the Commonwealth. Second, direct funding would improve the accountability and transparency of the Commonwealth to the electorate. 81 The move was largely unchallenged, and certainly faced no constitutional attack. In fact, the Opposition supported the move. 82 After it came to power in March 1996, the Howard Coalition government continued the direct funding model. The Higher Education Support Act 2003 (Cth) ('HES Act') replaced the Higher Education Funding Act 1988 (Cth), whilst maintaining the system of direct grants to eligible higher education providers. A number of different grants are established. 83 The Commonwealth Grants Scheme provides an example of the funding schemes. Commonwealth Grant Scheme funding for 2008 was $3.794 billion. 84 Part 2-2 sets out the scheme and extensive mandatory statutory funding conditions. These include the filling of enrolments with Commonwealth supported places, limits on other student contribution amounts, upfront payments and tuition fees to be charged by the provider. 85 The Minister may include additional conditions in the funding agreement. 86 Individual funding agreements are not readily available. Further funding conditions are contained in the 'quality and accountability requirements'. 87 These are set out in detail in Division 19. 'Quality and accountability requirements' include financial viability and reporting requirements, quality, accreditation and auditing requirements, fairness and equal treatment requirements, grievance and review requirements, information privacy requirements, compliance requirements and student contribution and fee requirements (that is, limitations on the amounts of additional fees the provider is able to charge). In 2005, an additional fairness requirement was inserted which required providers to ensure contributions to and membership of student unions were voluntary. 88 The Commonwealth Grant Scheme Guidelines provided an additional layer to this complex funding scheme. 89 The Guidelines are a form of delegated legislation which is subject to disallowance by a House of Parliament. 90 The Guidelines place obligations on higher education providers. Under the Howard Coalition Government these included the 'National Governance Protocols' and the 'Higher Education Workplace Relations Requirements'. 91 Failure to comply with these obligations would lead to a reduction in grant amounts. 92 The National Governance Protocols required providers to conform to 11 protocols. 93 These required the higher education provider to have its objectives or functions specified in its enabling legislation. It was required to have a governing body which oversaw the provider, for example, approved its mission and strategic direction. The protocols also required a codified and published internal grievance procedure and an annual report on high level outcomes and risk management. 94 The Higher Education Workplace Relations Requirements placed obligations on providers relating to certified agreements and workplace policies and practices. 95 The Requirements included offering Australian Workplace Agreements to employees, providing for direct consultation between the employees and the higher education provider (with the involvement of third parties, presumably trade unions, only at the request of the employee), promoting fair and flexible working arrangements, supporting organisational productivity and performance through fair and transparent performance management schemes which reward high performing individual staff and neither encouraging or discouraging union membership, and ensuring Commonwealth Grant Scheme funds were not used to pay union staff salaries or fund union facilities and activities. 96 Beyond the HES Act 2003 (Cth) there are few non-legislative tertiary funding schemes. One example is the Voluntary Student Unionism Transition Fund which was established after compulsory student unionism was abolished 97 (in lieu of the sporting and recreational facility funding that had previously been provided by unions). Eighty million dollars was allocated to the fund and payments commenced in 2007 for a period of three years. Funding was provided under a contract with the department, the terms of funding to be determined by the Minister. 98 103 The use of direct funding in schools increased during the Howard Coalition government. Three hundred and forty-five million dollars was provided for annual appropriation funding in 2007-08. 104 106 The individual funding programs in Output 1 cover a number of different grants. Current grants include the National School Chaplaincy Programme which provides funding to schools for pastoral care which commenced in 2006-07. Eighty million dollars has been tagged over three years. 107 Funding is provided to recipients under a funding agreement of which the National School Chaplaincy Programme Guidelines form part. Conditions of funding include acknowledgement of Commonwealth funding and compliance with the Chaplaincy Code of Conduct. 108 Individual funding agreements are not readily available.
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Volume 37 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Other schemes rely on annual budgetary appropriations and non-legislatively backed exercises of the funding power. The Appropriation Act (No 1) 2007 (Cth) appropriated $428.739 million for the Department of Education, Science and Training 'Outcome 1', 'School Education -individuals achieve high quality foundation skills and learning from schools and other providers'. The Portfolio Budget Statement of the Department breaks the output down into various types of expenditure which includes estimates for individual funding programs.This compares to $109.768 million in 2003-04 105 and $42.808 million in 1999-2000.
3
Democratic and federal critiques The HES Act 2003 (Cth) demonstrates the effectiveness of Commonwealth funding agreements in policy implementation. The diverse and highly specific conditions illustrate how the Commonwealth's funding can be used to regulate behaviours not clearly related to the efficiency of the funding itself, such as the higher education provider's governance structure and strategic direction, workplace relations and student unionism. With such large amounts of funding being made available, it places tertiary providers who do not wish to comply with the conditions in an untenable position. The non-legislatively backed funding schemes in the primary, secondary and tertiary sector demonstrate some of the accountability and legitimacy shortcomings of the current budgetary processes. The appropriation legislation provides general outcomes which are approved by Parliament. General breakdowns of the funding schemes are then provided in the Portfolio Budget Statements. However, the individual details and conditions of each scheme are found only in departmental websites, if at all. Further, whilst many of the funding schemes have some publicly available terms and conditions, 109 there is an underlying discretion left with the relevant Minister to determine any additional terms and conditions. 110 Copies of individual funding agreements are not readily accessible, although the houses of Parliament would have the power to compel their production. 111 Nonetheless, agreements and funding conditions are often unpublished and subject to 'fluctuation' at the discretion of the executive. 112 One of the implications of moving from s 96 State grants to direct funding is that the location of the appropriation changes, even though the nature of the funding is very similar. As outlined above, under the dichotomy drawn in s 53 of the Constitution between the ordinary annual services of the government and special expenditures, appropriations for State grants must be in legislation subject to amendment by the Senate, whereas funding for the same outcome, if made directly, may fall within the agreed definitions of 'ordinary annual services of government'. For example, all the non-legislative funding schemes to schools and higher education providers, appropriated in Appropriation Act (No 1) 2007 (Cth) are not amendable by the Senate.
The federal division of power gives the Commonwealth power over several areas which may allow it to regulate, to some degree, primary, secondary and tertiary education. These include the corporations power in s 51(xx), the power to provide benefits to students under s 51(xxiiiA) and an implied 'nationhood power'. 113 However, none provide a plenary power. Whilst the corporations power will cover many higher education institutions, 114 it will not cover all primary and secondary schools. 115 
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Volume 37 ____________________________________________________________________________________ encompasses payments made by the Commonwealth directly to students and payments made to higher education providers to provide benefits to students. 116 However, it is unlikely that conditions attached to the payments relating to, for example, industrial relations and higher education provider internal governance would be caught by the power, even its incidental aspect. 117 The nationhood power 118 may be used to support academic research. 119 To use funding agreements to regulate education in a plenary way therefore takes Commonwealth influence into fields beyond the federal division of powers. To justify this expanded use, a general implied spending power has often been asserted in the Constitution itself.
V A GENERAL SPENDING POWER? MAKING SENSE OF THE APPROPRIATIONS POWER
Commentators and advisors have speculated that at least part of the HES Act 2003 (Cth) is supported by such a general spending power. 120 The constitutional provisions upon which such a power sits are ss 81 and 61 (set out in Part II above). Can s 81 be a constitutional 'hook' on which to hang a general spending power? Alarmed at the potential expansion of federal power that this could herald, politicians, lawyers and judges have looked to the words 'purposes of the Commonwealth' to limit the operation of the section. Others have sought to limit the effect of the appropriations power, asserting that it cannot support more than mere spending of money, which must be based on a further source of power (usually s 61). To understand the nature of the appropriations power, the history surrounding it will be discussed, followed by an analysis of the jurisprudence on its interpretation. Ultimately, this part concludes that the appropriations power is actually a misnomer. Section 81 is not a 'power' at all but a parliamentary fiscal supervision mechanism, and is certainly not sufficient to support a general spending power and therefore the broad provisions of the HES Act 2003 (Cth). 
A
History of the appropriations power The history of parliamentary control of appropriations in the United Kingdom and Australia has been well documented elsewhere. 121 What follows is a brief overview of the relevant features.
1
United Kingdom Grants of supply by the House of Commons for specified purposes became common in the 14 th century. 122 Under Henry IV, in 1404 Parliament granted subsidies for the defence of the kingdom and not otherwise. 123 Under Henry VI, an example of a clause accompanying supply in 1426 read 'it ne no part thereof be beset ne dispendid to no othir use, but oonly in and for the defense of the seid roialme.' 124 The practice of providing supply for specific purposes subsequently lay in abeyance under the strong Tudor monarchy, but re-emerged under the Stuart Kings. 125 Between 1603 and 1608, James I ran the accounts at an annual deficit of £90,000. 126 This led to the re-emergence of purposive grants as Parliament once again became key to the public purse. 127 Charles I relied to some extent on the contentious levying of ship money to secure taxation and supply without the requirement of parliamentary approval. 128 In 1641, under the Long Parliament, purposive grants were again made. 129 During the Commonwealth (1649-60), Parliament became acquainted with financial control and regulation. 130 After the fall of the Commonwealth it was asserted in some, but not all, cases under Charles II. 131 In 1665, £1.25 million was granted for the 'Dutch war'. The Act included a clause that the money was to be applied only to the purposes of the war and should not be issued out of the Exchequer except by order or warrant 
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Volume 37 ____________________________________________________________________________________ that it was for such purposes. 132 In desperate need of finance, Charles II agreed to the clause. 133 Parliament enforced the clause strictly. The Treasurer of the Navy paid out moneys without a warrant and Parliament insisted on his dismissal. 134 Parliamentary control of taxes was a necessary precursor to parliamentary control of expenditure although, by their nature, they developed almost simultaneously. The Bill of Rights of 1689 cemented the convention that there could be no taxation without parliamentary approval. 135 The process of stipulating purposes for which appropriations may be made was also invariably followed after this date. 136 Other important reforms in the appropriation process occurred in the 1860s. In 1861, William Gladstone sought to achieve parliamentary control over government expenditure by establishing the Committee of Public Accounts to examine parliamentary appropriations. 137 The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866 (UK) required annual departmental 'appropriation' accounts. The Act also established the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Exchequer and Audit Department with dual functions: to authorise the issue of public money (if satisfied the expenditure fell within the relevant parliamentary appropriation) and to report to Parliament. 138 These practices continue to this day with little modification. 139 The
current position regarding the implications of appropriation legislation in the United Kingdom is conveniently summarised in Erskine May's Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament:
(1) An amount appropriated to a particular service cannot be used for another service.
(2) The amount appropriated is a maximum amount. _____________________________________________________________________________________ 132 As referred to in Plucknett, above n 122 and ibid 310. 133 Believing that the bankers would be more inclined to provide the funds with its inclusion:
Plucknett, above n 122, 428-9. 134 The more usual form of appropriation control was introduced in s 34 of the Australian Constitutions Act 1842 which provided that appropriations must be 'to the public service' of the colony. 142 The Victorian Constitution Act 1855, provided in s 44:
All Taxes, Imposts, Rates, and Duties, and all territorial, casual, and other Revenues of the Crown, (including Royalties,) from whatever Source arising, within the Colony of Victoria, or over which the present or any future Legislature has or may have Power of Appropriation, shall form One Consolidated Revenue, to be appropriated for the Public Service of the Colony of Victoria, in the Manner and subject to the Charges herein-after mentioned. 143 The substance of the provision was brought across into s 89 of the Constitution Act 1975 (Vic), where it remains.
The NSW Constitution Act 1855 made similar provision that appropriations must be 'for the Public Service of this Colony' in s 47. Section 53 provided that revenue was to be appropriated 'to such specific Purposes as by any Act … shall be prescribed ' (NSW) which had the object of merging the Consolidated Fund and the General Loan Account. The reference to the appropriation for the 'public service of New South Wales' was removed in this amendment. However, s 45 still provides that the Consolidated Fund shall be subject to be appropriated to such specific purposes as may be prescribed by any Act in that behalf.
3
Australian Constitution The framers of the Constitution enshrined the United Kingdom and colonial practices regarding financial legislation in several provisions. Most important are ss 81 and 83. 145 Section 81 was originally introduced in 1891 as cl 1 of ch IV. It read:
All duties, revenues and moneys, raised or received by the Executive Government of the Commonwealth under the authority of this Constitution shall form one Consolidated Revenue Fund to be appropriated for the public service of the Commonwealth … 146 This draft was presented at the 1897 conference and remained substantially unchanged until the final drafting amendments before the first Report. In that process, the words 'public services' were changed to 'purposes'. 147 It would appear that 'public services' was changed to 'purposes' after concerns were voiced about whether it would cover appropriation for grants to the States under ss 89 and 93. 148 The colonial and constitutional history of s 81 indicates that it is the evolved written form of an English convention regarding fiscal supervision of the executive by Parliament. There is no indication that it was ever intended or contemplated to be a restriction on the scope of the purposes for which appropriations may be provided. Any conclusion resting on historical intention must of course also be considered in the context that Australia, whilst adopting the Westminster system of responsible government from the United Kingdom, also adopted a federal model. In a federation, the delicate balance between the national and sub-national governments can be severely skewed by the federal spending power and therefore the limitation on this power is a very live issue. However, historically at least, there is no indication to suggest that the intention of the phrase 'purposes of the Commonwealth' was to act as such a federal limit. It is contended that any such limit must be found elsewhere.
B

Constitutional jurisprudence
Interpreting s 81 has given rise to several important episodes in Australia's constitutional history. Several views have been taken of the words 'purposes of the Commonwealth', and whilst none have received unequivocal endorsement by the High Court, it appears that a broader view is favoured. The narrowest view restricts the purposes for which appropriations can be made to the legislative powers of the Commonwealth. A slightly broader view is that the 'purposes of the Commonwealth' includes the legislative, executive and judicial competence of the Commonwealth and encompasses an implied 'nationhood' power. Finally, the broadest view emphasises Parliament's role under s 81; the 'purposes of the Commonwealth' are those which Parliament decides and are therefore not justiciable. 
1
Early views The early federal initiatives to use the spending power drew a line between the three views of s 81 discussed above. Quick and Garran were of the narrow view that the appropriation and spending powers were impliedly limited to the purposes for which the Commonwealth had the power to make laws. 149 Several MPs raised doubts about the validity of the Maternity Allowance Bill in 1912. The Protectionist Party took a narrow view of the power, whilst the Prime Minister, Andrew Fisher, and Billy Hughes, the Attorney-General, indicated that they believed the Commonwealth was 'at liberty to spend its own money as it pleases' and was not confined to the enumerated powers. 150 The Advances to Settlers Bill 1923 (Cth) saw John Latham (later Chief Justice of the High Court which decided the Pharmaceutical Benefits Case) raise issues regarding the power. 151 The Bill concerned an appropriation of £250,000 to purchase wire netting and supply it to settlers on price and conditions as prescribed. State commissions were to be set up to distribute the wire. Latham delivered a speech against the constitutionality of the Bill:
If the mere voting of money is to bring a matter within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth, any matter may be dealt with in this Parliament. Take, for example, the subject of education. That is distinctly a matter for State action. It is obvious however, that by a liberal grant of money, the Commonwealth government could obtain control of the whole educational system of Australia. 152 Two Royal Commissions in the late 1920s further cemented these divisions. 153 Sir Robert Garran, Commonwealth Solicitor-General, indicated that he had always considered s 81 'an absolute power of appropriation for general purposes, and the Commonwealth Parliament has always acted on that supposition.' 154 Sir Robert went on to refer to a number of Commonwealth appropriations for purposes not immediately connected to a head of power. 155 Owen Dixon (amongst others) adhered to the narrower view that the spending power of the Commonwealth was limited to its legislative powers. 156
2
The High Court The High Court has had to consider directly the nature and limitations of the Commonwealth's implied spending power on only two occasions, 157 Commonwealth spending has focussed upon health, social welfare and education, areas in which extra funding is sorely needed. Further, the establishment of the requisite standing has always been viewed as a difficulty in any challenge. Finally, at least more recently, cooperative federalism and political compromise appear to be the preferred mechanism for the resolution of disputes over funding. 158 In 1945 in the Pharmaceutical Benefits Case five separate judgments were handed down 159 and three positions can be extracted. The first, and broadest, is that of McTiernan J. For McTiernan J, the term 'purposes of the Commonwealth' was not jurisdictionally limited and such purposes were for Parliament to determine. As such, the question was not subject to judicial scrutiny. Chief Justice Latham agreed with this position. 160 However, he did note that that '… there cannot be appropriations in blank, appropriations for no designated purpose, merely authorizing expenditure with no reference to purpose.' 161 Chief Justice Latham made a further distinction. Whilst his Honour held that 'the purposes of the Commonwealth' was not a limiting phrase, the effect of an appropriation was limited, and could not provide the basis for a broad, detailed and coercive scheme such as provided in the Pharmaceutical Benefits Act 1944 (Cth). His Honour drew an analogy with a corporation: just because a company may be able to subscribe to a hospital or football club does not necessarily mean that it may run one. 162 Justices Starke 163 and Williams 164 indicated that they interpreted s 81 more narrowly, limiting it to a power to appropriate for purposes within the Commonwealth's legislative, executive or judicial competence. Justice Dixon, 165 indicated a similar view, although he did not have to decide the matter based on his _____________________________________________________________________________________ Commonwealth (1935) 52 CLR 533 ('Clothing Factory Case') found that it was unnecessary to decide the 'grave question' as to whether s 81 enabled spending on matters outside of the legislative and executive competence of the Commonwealth: 559-60 (Gavan Duffy CJ, Evatt and McTiernan JJ). Justice Starke considered the issue and, drawing distinctions from the United States jurisprudence on the matter, concluded that the power did not enable the Commonwealth to appropriate funds for the purposes it saw fit, but was restricted to 'the subjects assigned to, or departments or matters placed under the control of the Federal Government by the Constitution': 568 (Starke J). view that the extent of the regulation went beyond what would have been authorised by the appropriation, regardless of whether a wider or narrower view of the appropriation power was taken. Justices Starke and Dixon referred to the purposes of the Commonwealth extending to an implied nationhood power if necessary. The scheme was held to be invalid. 166 In the AAP Case, the opposite decision was arrived at. Justices McTiernan, Mason and Murphy all held that the phrase 'purposes of the Commonwealth' did not limit the purposes for which Parliament could make appropriations. Justice Mason drew a similar distinction to that drawn by Latham CJ. His Honour found that Parliament's power to appropriate is not limited by the words 'for the purposes of the Commonwealth'. However, his Honour found that the ability of Parliament to provide for appropriation was distinct from the ability of the executive to spend the money. He found that an appropriation was of limited effect, a 'rara avis in the world of statutes'; 167 it authorised the withdrawal of money from the CRF and payment to a recipient. Beyond this, additional power must come from the Commonwealth's executive, legislative or judicial powers. 168 Therefore, whilst Mason J upheld the validity of the appropriations on which the AAP was based, he struck down the extensive scheme associated with the regional councils. This appears similar to the reasoning of Jacobs J, who held that an appropriation was a limited (probably nonjusticiable) act that merely 'earmarked' the money. 169 However, the expenditure itself may be challenged as beyond the (prerogative) power of the Crown. 170 Ultimately, Jacobs J took a generous view of the prerogative power and upheld the scheme.
Chief Justice Barwick and Gibbs J held that the power was limited by the words 'purposes of the Commonwealth' to the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the Commonwealth (including an implied nationhood power). Justice Stephen found that Victoria did not have standing to bring the action because it was an internal matter between Parliament and the executive. 171 This summary of the judgments (whilst necessarily simplistic) demonstrates the unclear status of the law regarding the appropriations power following the AAP Case.
Chief Justice Mason, Deane and Gaudron JJ attempted to summarise the scope of s 81 after the AAP Case in Davis v Commonwealth. 172 Their Honours said the case stands as an authority for the proposition that the validity of an appropriation act is not ordinarily susceptible to effective legal challenge. It is unnecessary to consider whether there are extraordinary circumstances in which an appropriation of money by the Parliament may be susceptible to such challenge. 173 This summary may reflect the ultimate outcome of the AAP Case decision but it is clearly insufficient when the diverse reasoning is accounted for. For example, it fails to take into account the relationship between ss 81 and 61 that Mason and Jacobs JJ considered. The AAP Case does not stand as authority for anything so clearly as this summary in Davis v Commonwealth suggests.
In both the Pharmaceutical Benefits and AAP Cases, the judges did not utilise one clear line of reasoning. Those judges who favoured a wide view of the appropriations power employed a number of reasons in support of that position. The words of s 81 were contrasted with the words in s 51 (xxxi), which explicitly refer to 'purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws'. 174 The term 'Commonwealth' in s 81 was interpreted as referring to the union of the people of Australia, as used in the preamble to the Constitution, rather than the federal political entity of limited powers created by the Constitution. 175 Some judges drew on practical considerations, for example: that limiting the power may result in invalidating appropriations which had already been spent, creating a potential chilling effect on executive action; limiting the Commonwealth's power to provide grants to worthwhile causes; and, by reference to the current parliamentary practice. 176 Justice Murphy drew on the United States jurisprudence to support his view. 177 The judges who took the narrower view criticised the wider view. Chief Justice Barwick said:
That is but an example of 'words meaning what I says they mean', a notion more likely to be found in fantasy than in constitutional law. 178 In support of the narrow view, the ordinary and natural meaning of the words was relied upon. 179 A different meaning of the term 'Commonwealth' in s 81 was taken: it was interpreted as the political body created by the Constitution, as referred to throughout the text. 180 The United States constitutional position was distinguished from the Australian text. 181 Section 96 was drawn upon by several judges, as it operated to extend the Commonwealth's ability to appropriate beyond the competence of the Commonwealth (thereby implying that it must, in fact, be limited). 182 The history of the federal union was relied upon, with reference back to the idea of a surplus being distributed to the States: to allow for a surplus, the Commonwealth's spending power must be limited. 183 The state of the law as to the nature and limits, if any, of s 81 remains in flux. There is no clear majority support for whether the power is justiciable and, if it is, whether there are competent parties to bring an action for breach of its limits, and what those limits are. The 1988 Constitutional Commission noted the uncertain state of the law surrounding s 81, recommending that it be clarified by an amendment to the effect that appropriations from the CRF be for 'any purpose that the Parliament thinks fit'. 184
C
Conclusions: The limits of the spending power This article's opening was that 'there must be limits' to the Commonwealth spending power. The federal and democratic critiques discussed above demonstrate the reasons for accepting limitations on the spending power; this next part suggests what those limits should be by analysing the true construction of ss 61 and 81.
1
Parliament's role The term 'purposes of the Commonwealth' was drawn from colonial constitutions which reflected United Kingdom practice regarding parliamentary supervision of appropriations. It was never a term of federal limitation, rather a reflection of the convention of parliamentary supervision. The term requires Parliament to take the lead role in scrutinising executive expenditure and fulfil its role in a system of representative and responsible government to provide legitimacy and accountability. Practically, this should operate as a representative limitation on executive power.
However, the reality is that, unlike the courts, Parliament is also driven by institutional interests to fulfil (or not fulfil) its constitutional role; it is not solely influenced by 'constitutional duty'. 185 For example, in relation to the adoption of clear budgetary and appropriations processes, Professor Uhr commented:
What institutional incentives do parties in official Opposition have to restrain executive powers enjoyed by the party in government, especially when these relate to obscure budget procedures which the Opposition party can hope to use for its own benefit when next in executive office? 186 So whilst an assertion that Parliament ought to take a more active approach in scrutinising appropriations and government spending is attractive, 187 it is not a completely satisfactory conclusion. The courts must have a role to ensure that the Parliament is exercising its constitutional duty of supervision. 188 The role of Parliament in authorising appropriations in Australia is more than a convention; it is required under the Constitution. 189 The judicial review of this power is therefore consistent with the acceptance of constitutional judicial review in Australia as 'axiomatic'. 190 However, introducing judicial review of Parliament's role is not without difficulties. For example, who has the standing to enforce Parliament's duty? Is there a minimum specificity to which purposes must be stated to comply with the Constitution?
The issue of standing has plagued challenges to the appropriations power. A detailed consideration of the law in this area is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Federal Law Review
Volume 37 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Although it is interesting to note that, where necessary, the Court has almost always been able to find the required standing: 191 whether that be in the States, 192 State Attorneys-General, 193 citizens, 194 MPs, 195 or interested organisations. 196 Combet highlights the difficulties in determining the second question. The plaintiffs had argued that the language of ss 56, 81 and 83 of the Constitution required that:
there must be a purpose and that purpose must be capable of acting as a legal constraint, from which it follows that the purpose must be expressed by reference to some legally ascertainable standard or criterion sufficient to constitute a discernible and enforceable standard on Executive conduct. 197 Commenting on the case, Lindell suggested that 'explicit authorisation was needed to show that parliament intended to authorise that expenditure.' 198 The discussion of the majority decision above demonstrates that the High Court rejected these arguments in Combet. This article however endorses them. The history and objective behind s 81 demonstrate that the purposes for which appropriations are made must be intended by Parliament. Section 81 embodies a convention developed to ensure Parliament controlled the key to the CRF. To give this control meaning, the purposes can only be those intended by Parliament. Further, it also requires these purposes to be ascertainable by both parliamentarians and a reasonably well informed citizen. 199 These fictitious 'reasonable persons' (ultimately the substantial source and beneficiaries of the expenditures) must be able to relate the actual expenditure incurred by the executive to the purposes for which the appropriation was made by the Parliament. This is necessary to ensure that Parliament is in fact approving the purposes of appropriations -how can purposes be approved if the results are unascertainable? 200 It is also fundamental to the transparent operation of Parliament as a representative body of the Australian people. This form of limit would preclude, for example, the inclusion of purposes which at the time of the appropriation could not have been contemplated. 201 The clear stipulation of purposes also allows for proper auditing of expenditure as provided for in s 97 of the Constitution. 202 ____________________________________________________________________________________
2
Regulation: Limitations on the source of power The politically limiting effect of parliamentary supervision cannot be the only limitation on the executive spending power. Alone, it does not address the issues raised by the federal critique. The second type of limitation must be at the source of the power itself. It is suggested that Parliament cannot appropriate and thereby authorise expenditure on matters outside the legislative competence of the Commonwealth where the executive attempts to do more than merely spend the appropriated moneys.
Whilst s 81 is generally referred to as the 'appropriations power', its correct classification is not as a 'power' at all, at least not in the sense of powers conferred by ss 51 and 52. It is a convention which was developed historically as a fiscal accounting mechanism which has found constitutional form in Australia. The nature of an appropriation is therefore such that it does no more than 'earmark' money. 203 It 'neither betters nor worsens transactions in which the executive engages within its constitutional domain'. 204 Therefore whilst it may indicate Parliament consents to the expenditure of money on a particular purpose, it does not provide the power to make that expenditure. This view of the law is supported by the 1988 Constitutional Commission. 205 The Commission viewed its recommendation (to allow appropriations from the CRF for 'any purpose that the Parliament thinks fit') 206 as 'unlikely to have any major consequences for the distribution of powers between the Commonwealth and the States'. 207 These conclusions seem contradictory to obiter comments in Brown v West. 208 The issue in that case was whether an appropriation could authorise expenditure on postage allowances additional to an allowance determined under statute. The first question the Court considered was whether the executive power extended to such an action. 209 The second question was whether the appropriation legislation conferred additional power on the executive and overrode prior statutes. 210 The Court held that it did not. 211 However, the proposed limitation would require the answer that, as appropriation legislation, it cannot.
Money may be appropriated for purposes outside the legislative competence of the Commonwealth, but for the executive to do more than merely spend that money requires a further source of power. 212 This throws up two questions for consideration: when does the government do more than merely spend the money, and where does the further source of power come from?
The distinction between mere spending and something that amounts to more than that is difficult. There are two types of activities which go beyond mere spending. The first is the engagement in activities; clearly there is a distinction between providing funding to a third party to engage in activities and engaging in those very activities oneself. Justice Mason explained:
An appropriation … has a limited effect. It may provide the necessary parliamentary sanction for the withdrawal of money from Consolidated Revenue and the payment or subscription of money to a particular recipient or for a particular purpose but it does not supply legal authority for the Commonwealth's engagement in the activities in connexion with which the moneys are to be spent. 213 The second type of activity which goes beyond mere spending is the regulation of activities to which funding is applied. Chief Justice Latham in the Pharmaceutical Benefits Case explained using public health:
Under s 51 (ix) the Commonwealth Parliament has power to make laws with respect to quarantine … In relation to quarantine the Commonwealth Parliament has full powers of legislation. It can not only provide that money shall be spent upon quarantine, but it can devise and put into operation a whole compulsory system of quarantine under which duties can be imposed upon persons and penalties inflicted for breach of the law. But in relation to other aspects of public health the Commonwealth … has no such power of legislation. The Commonwealth can, in my view, authorize the expenditure of public money on inquiries, investigations, research and advocacy in relation to matters affecting public health. But the Parliament could not pass a law requiring citizens of the States to keep their premises clean or to submit to vaccination or immunization. 214 The Chief Justice was referring to circumstances in which the Commonwealth attempts to legislate. The author asserts that the principle must, however, go further than this and include de facto regulation achieved through funding agreements.
Hogg asserts a fundamental distinction between legislation and regulation through spending because of the voluntary acceptance of the latter. Therefore, he argues, spending should be unconstrained by the distribution of legislative powers in the Constitution. He asserts that through the attachment of conditions to spending, lending or contracting, the government is 'not purporting to exercise any peculiarly governmental authority over its subjects .' 215 This is also consistent with the comments of Dixon CJ in the Second Uniform Tax Case regarding the operation of s 96 of the Constitution. 216 His Honour stated that in s 96 there was 'nothing coercive' as there was no power to compel the acceptance of the grants and its conditions. 217 This position is not consistent with the general views of the nature of governmental power held by Australian commentators, who have recognised the peculiar ( public) nature of government contracting. 218 There are a number of compelling reasons for the distinction. First, the huge resources available to the government undermine the comparison with individuals' powers. 219 Even Hogg has to concede that sometimes the nature of the contract as 'voluntary' is stretched due to bargaining power discrepancies. 220 Second, the government is under a duty to act in the public interest which is not mirrored for private individuals, who may be motivated by commercial, selfish or philanthropic goals. 221 Finally, the basis of government funding differs substantially from that of private funding. Government funding comes from the CRF, composed, in substantial part, of the taxation revenues of the federal government. This is public money which is generated through compulsory exactions. 222 If funding is refused by a potential recipient, it is likely to go elsewhere, with no alternative benefit available. This raises issues of compulsory taxation without benefit.
The peculiar nature of government funding is illustrated by the HES Act 2003 (Cth). Commonwealth university funding reached $7.816 billion in 2005. 223 When faced with the possibility of losing public (tax payer based) funding, or complying with the attached conditions, the choice becomes substantially less 'voluntary'.
Overseas, these distinctions have also been considered. 224 In the United States, the Supreme Court has interpreted their roughly equivalent spending power in a very broad manner, on the underlying justification that it is voluntary in nature: recipients remain free to accept or reject federal funds. 225 The spending power can therefore not be exercised in a manner where 'pressure turns into compulsion'. 226 There have been no cases however in which this has been found, leading many commentators to assert that it is unlikely financial pressure alone could ever amount to compulsion. 227 The opposing view has been put forward in dissent and by scholars; for example, O'Connor J in South Dakota v Dole argued the substance of the action must be considered to determine whether it was an 'attempt to regulate'. 228 Further, in the context where California attempted to regulate an area forbidden by federal law through conditional funding, the Supreme Court held that a state cannot use funding to indirectly regulate areas in which it cannot directly regulate. 229 In the Canadian context, these distinctions have also been judicially recognised. 230 Spending which 'in fact' amounts to regulation in a field of exclusively provincial competence is generally considered unconstitutional. 231 The question of when conditional spending becomes regulation is difficult. A brief look at the Canadian authorities provides some guidance. In Winterhaven Stables the Alberta Court of Appeal 232 considered that conditional federal funding which was provided under a scheme which contained 'opting out' arrangements (whereby provinces which did not wish to partake in federally funded schemes would receive compensation in the form of funding from the federal government to provide the relevant services themselves) did not 'in fact' amount to regulation or control. 233 The availability of opting out arrangements seems important to shift power imbalances and give a true choice to the recipient as to whether they will accept federal funding.
The conclusion that conditional funding requires an additional source of power is consistent with some comments of Mason J in the AAP Case. In considering the breadth of the executive and appropriations powers, he emphasised the importance of s 96. His Honour stated that its inclusion demonstrated that there was a large area of activity beyond the federal executive power which is able to become the subject of conditions to s 96 grants. 234 Deducted from Mason J's proposition is that the Commonwealth does not have power to make conditional grants to non-State parties (that is, not under s 96) in areas beyond its competence.
Spending money in a manner which amounts to regulation is not necessarily beyond the Commonwealth's power in Australia. However, a further source of power must be identified on which to base this extension of power. This lies in the executive power of the Commonwealth (s 61 of the Constitution). The breadth of the Commonwealth executive's power to enter into funding agreements (essentially contracts) will therefore determine the breadth of the spending power in these instances.
VI COMMONWEALTH EXECUTIVE POWER TO CONTRACT
It is relatively undisputed that the executive power in s 61 includes a capacity to contract. That is not to say that the Commonwealth's capacity to contract is unlimited. It is possibly limited in two ways. First, the High Court has stated that contracts in the ordinary course of government administration do not require prior legislative approval. 235 The delineation between contracts made in the ordinary course of government administration and other contracts has been criticised by commentators subsequently. 236 Campbell asserts that Parliament is required to appropriate funds for all contracts and there is no valid reason to maintain the distinction. 237 In the United Kingdom, a recent decision of the Court of Appeal continues to highlight opposing judicial opinion on the matter. 238 Closer parliamentary scrutiny of contracts entered into outside the ordinary course of government administration is consistent with the distinction in s 53 of the Constitution. Appropriations for the ordinary annual services of the government are subjected to fewer Senate powers over amendment and special appropriations. Second, the breadth of the executive power will limit its ability to contract. Winterton creates a distinction between the depth and the breadth of executive power. The depth of executive power describes the activities which the executive may undertake (including the capacity to contract). The breadth of the power describes over which areas those permissible activities may be executed. 239 
A
Two views There has been division amongst scholars as to whether the breadth of the contractual capacity is limited to those areas of Commonwealth constitutional responsibility. Those taking a narrow view of the executive power assert that, similar to the legislative power, it is divided federally between the Commonwealth and the States. Therefore, the capacity to contract should be limited by the constitutional distribution of powers. 240 The opposing argument is that the Commonwealth executive has an unlimited capacity to contract. This argument is based on two distinct lines of reasoning. The first is that the capacity to contract is not a distinctly governmental function, but is a capacity enjoyed by both the executive and ordinary citizens and as such is an essentially private function; it is not subject to the division of power as would be a public function. 241 This argument has been heavily criticised on the basis that the government (even when entering into contracts) necessarily acts in a public manner. 242 The second view begins from a premise that the executive power is limited to the legislative competence of the Commonwealth. However, this argument continues to contend that the incidental legislative power, coupled with the appropriations power in s 81, provides a base for unlimited Commonwealth executive contractual power. 243 This view is inconsistent with the view of the author that s 81 is a limited provision which does not independently provide power to the Commonwealth.
Whilst there remains division amongst scholars, the narrower approach should be preferred. It is most consistent with the general scheme of the Constitution. The division of power between the Commonwealth and the States is strictly guarded. Only in specific instances can the Commonwealth intrude into State competence, and only where there is the consent of the States. For example, s 51(xxxvii) confers legislative power over those areas only on referral by the States. Section 96 confers a funding (and necessarily spending) power to the States which allows for funding in areas beyond Commonwealth competence, but in circumstances where the States must be free to reject the funding. It is also consistent with the importance placed by the High Court on responsible government and the accountability of executive action to Parliament. 244 
B
Executive power: Legislative competence plus a nationhood power Adoption of the narrow view of the executive power begs the question -how is executive power divided between the Commonwealth and the States? The generally held view is that executive competence mirrors legislative competence including the addition of a power inherent in the development of Australian 'nationhood'. 245 The nationhood power can be coupled with the incidental power in s 51(xxxix) to provide an additional head of legislative power. The existence of the nationhood power has been accepted on several occasions. 246 However, how it is determined whether an activity falls within the power remains unclear. Winterton has criticised how judges determine whether activities fall within the executive power. 247 Judgments such as that of Mason and Jacobs JJ in the AAP Case which assert that, for example, scientific research and other pursuits fall within the power merely state conclusions, assuming the legal reasoning. 248 Similarly, Barwick CJ states:
The extent of the powers which are inherent in the fact of nationhood and of international personality has not been fully explored. Some of them may readily by recognised: and in furtherance of such powers money may properly be spent. One such power, for example, is the power to explore, whether it be foreign lands or seas or in areas of scientific knowledge or technology. 249 How these activities are 'readily recognised' is not extrapolated. No legally ascertainable criterion emerges from the judgments which could be applied in novel circumstances to determine whether it would fall within the nationhood power.
Judges have also asserted that the scope of the power will change as Australia develops: things which may not have previously held national significance may evolve to do so. 250 This adds a further level of uncertainty in determining the scope of the power at any given time.
Whilst not comprehensively addressing these criticisms, the judges have made some attempt to define and limit the power. Justice Mason stated:
However, the executive power to engage in activities appropriate to a national government, arising as it does from an implication drawn from the Constitution and having no counterpart, apart from the incidental power, in the expressed heads of legislative power, is limited in scope. It would be inconsistent with the broad division of responsibilities between the Commonwealth and the States achieved by the distribution of legislative powers to concede to this aspect of the executive power a wider operation effecting a radical transformation in what has hitherto been thought to be the Commonwealth's area of responsibility under the Constitution, thereby enabling the Commonwealth to carry out within Australia programmes standing outside the acknowledged heads of legislative power merely because these programmes can be conveniently formulated and administered by the national government. 251 Other judges have expressed similar sentiments, developing tests regarding the necessary federal limitations on the power. For example, Barwick CJ asserted that a matter did not fall within the power merely because it was desirable that the power be exercised on a national basis, 252 or that a matter or situation was of national interest or concern. 253 The joint judgment in Davis v Commonwealth discussed the nationhood power and referred to the federal limits that the Constitution necessarily placed on it. They found that the existence of any such power would be 'clearest' where it involved no real competition with the State legislative competence. 254 The commemoration of the bicentenary was unanimously agreed to fall within such a power, although the offence provisions relating to use of particular symbols associated with the bicentennial were struck down.
The current test remains significantly unrefined and rather amorphous. However, as with all common law principles, the application of rules formulated by the High Court and the use of analogous examples in future cases will incrementally develop to clarify the test. The precise scope of the power may be elusive but as more areas of competence are considered, greater clarity as to the nature of actions that fall within the power will be given.
VII CONCLUSION
To summarise and exemplify the conclusions of the above analysis, the proposed limitations on the spending power of the Commonwealth, would: 1 require that Parliament specify the purposes for which the executive may spend money in the CRF. The courts would be able to review any purposes which are too vague and therefore unascertainable by parliamentarians and a reasonable person. Some of the vague and aspirational appropriations for purposes stated as 'outcomes' in the appropriations legislation, such as 'higher productivity' or 'higher pay', would not be sufficient. Whilst there is no bright line that can be drawn as to how much detail Parliament has to provide to satisfy this test, it must always come back to a question as to whether one can look at the purposes and know for what type of expenditure it is intended, or whether it encompasses an infinite and unascertainable number of possibilities. Further, spending for purposes not in contemplation at the time of the appropriation also would not ordinarily be ascertainable in this sense; and 2 require that if the executive were to use money correctly appropriated under (1) to either engage in activities such as running a business or to regulate a field of activity, these must be within the executive competence of the Commonwealth in s 61. That is, within the limitations of the powers in ss 51 and 52 or the implied nationhood power. Whilst the precise scope of the nationhood power has not yet been defined, the High Court has developed a general test, which will be clarified through application. Its confines are certainly not limitless, and therefore, neither are the limits of the spending power. These requirements can be applied, by way of example, to the provision of federal tertiary funding (which makes up a substantial proportion of such funding) on the condition that universities comply with a voluntary student unionism policy. If the argument that such funding amounts, in substance, to the regulation of this field, for the Commonwealth to offer such conditional funding, it must fall within the competence of the Commonwealth. The federal government has increasingly relied upon its funding capacity to achieve policy objectives in areas not necessarily within its legislative competence. During the Howard Coalition government, funding was particularly dominant in areas of education, health and local government. Funding agreements were used to benefit particular segments of society and funding conditions to push policy agendas. Whilst theoretically 'voluntary', funding is a very effective policy implementation tool because of the financial strength of the Commonwealth and the relatively weak bargaining position of the other parties. Extensive use of funding is not a new phenomenon in Australia but its return to favour highlights a number of governance problems stressed in the democratic and federal critiques.
Democractically, the legislative and non-legislative backed funding agreements in the education sector highlight the decrease in parliamentary accountability of executive spending and therefore a decrease in the efficiency of the responsible government convention. The budgetary processes that have been adopted provide appropriations to the executive on an open-ended basis in broad terms. Funding details (both in terms of expenditure and, particularly, conditions) are difficult to ascertain from the face of appropriation legislation, particularly with respect to nonlegislative funding.
Federally, the use of funding agreements broadly in the area of education is concerning. The legislative competence of the Commonwealth in this area is limited and consists of a number of heads of power cobbled together. A broad implied spending power may transcend the federal constitutional framework.
A general implied spending power rests on the appropriations power, coupled with the executive and incidental powers. This article has critically analysed this basis of the implied spending power to form a number of conclusions and ultimately suggest the two limitations on the federal spending power outlined above. The first limitation is practical; the power is limited by the practice of parliamentary scrutiny of expenditures through the appropriations process. The second limitation is more prescriptive; where the executive seeks to do more than merely spend it must do so only within the constitutional limits of the executive power.
Both limitations require the High Court to supervise the constitutional appropriations and expenditure processes in a stricter manner than it indicated in Combet it was willing to do. The democratic and federal critiques demonstrate the implications of failing to do so and stress the need for an alternative spending framework. The spending power must have limits.
